


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## Rumsfeld's Roadmap to Propaganda

**Secret Pentagon "roadmap" calls for "boundaries" between "information operations" abroad and at home but provides no actual limits as long as US doesn't "target" Americans**

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 177

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Posted - January 26, 2006

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By Mark Mazzetti  
*Los Angeles Times*  
January 27, 2006

**Washington, D.C., January 26, 2006** - A secret Pentagon **["roadmap" on war propaganda](#)**, personally approved by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in October 2003, calls for "boundaries" between information operations abroad and the news media at home, but provides for no such limits and claims that as long as the American public is not "targeted," any leakage of PSYOP to the American public does not matter.

Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive at George Washington University and posted on the Web today, the 74-page **["Information Operations Roadmap"](#)** admits that "information intended for foreign audiences, including public diplomacy and PSYOP, increasingly is consumed by our domestic audience and vice-versa," but argues that "the distinction between foreign and domestic audiences becomes more a question of USG [U.S. government] intent rather than information dissemination practices."

The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, amended in 1972 and 1998, prohibits the U.S. government from propagandizing the American public with information and psychological operations directed at foreign audiences; and several presidential directives, including Reagan's NSD-77 in 1983, Clinton's PDD-68 in 1999, and Bush's NSPD-16 in July 2002 (the latter two still classified), have set up specific structures to carry out public diplomacy and information operations. These and other documents relating to U.S. PSYOP programs were posted today as part of a new Archive Electronic Briefing Book.

Several press accounts have referred to the 2003 Pentagon document but today's posting is the first time the text has been publicly available. Sections of the document relating to computer network attack (CNA) and "offensive cyber operations" remain classified under black highlighting.

**"Pentagon  
Document Shows  
Messages  
Boomerang"**

By Robert Burns  
Associated Press  
January 26, 2006

## Rumsfeld's Roadmap to Propaganda

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 177

Edited by Kristin Adair

Posted - January 26, 2006

The [Information Operations Roadmap](#), a 30 October 2003 document approved personally by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "provides the Department with a plan to advance the goal of information operations as a core military competency" and "stands as another example of the Department's commitment to transform our military capabilities to keep pace with emerging threats and to exploit new opportunities afforded by innovation and rapidly developing information technologies." The plan was developed by an oversight panel led by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Resource and Plans) and representatives from the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Special Operations Command, among other organizations.


The Roadmap presents as one of its key assumptions the importance of Psychological Operations (PSYOP), particularly in wartime: "Effectively communicating U.S. Government (USG) capabilities and intentions is an important means of

combating the plans of our adversaries. The ability to rapidly disseminate persuasive information to diverse audiences in order to directly influence their decision-making is an increasingly powerful means of deterring aggression. Additionally, it undermines both senior leadership and popular support for employing terrorists or using weapons of mass destruction." The [military defines PSYOP](#) generally as "planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals."

The Roadmap has been cited in the media several times (see James Bamford, "The Man Who Sold the War: Meet John Rendon, Bush's general in the propaganda war," *Rolling Stone*, November 17, 2005; Stephen J. Hedges, "Media use backfires on U.S.; Many ask if Pentagon altered information to make case for war," *Chicago Tribune*, December 11, 2005.) [[see references](#)], but has not previously been released to the public. The document calls on DoD to enhance its capabilities in five key Information Operations (IO) areas: electronic warfare (EW), PSYOP, Operations Security (OPSEC), military deception and computer network operations (CNO).

In light of recent media coverage of alleged propaganda activities by the military in Iraq, the Roadmap gives as one of its recommendations the need to "Clarify Lanes in the Road for PSYOP, Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy." The U.S. government is legally prohibited from conflating these operations by targeting PSYOP activities--intended for foreign audiences--at the American public. [22 U.S.C. § 1461 \(Smith-Mundt Act\)](#), which created the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1948, directs that information about the United States and its policies intended for foreign audiences "shall not be disseminated within the United States, its territories, or possessions." Amendments to the Smith-Mundt Act in 1972 and 1998 further clarified the legal obligations of the government's public diplomacy apparatus and several presidential directives, including [Reagan's NSD-77](#) in 1983, [Clinton's PDD-68](#) in 1999, and [Bush's NSPD-16](#) in July 2002 (the latter two still classified), have set up specific structures and procedures, as well as further legal restrictions, regarding U.S. public diplomacy and information operations.

President [Clinton's secret Presidential Decision Directive \(PDD-68\)](#), issued on April 30,



The Roadmap was personally approved by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

1999, expanded public diplomacy and public affairs operations beyond USIA and the Department of State to include all agencies and set out the objective of IPI "to synchronize the informational objectives, themes and messages that will be projected overseas . . . to prevent and mitigate crises and to influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives." (PDD-68 also cautioned against using the new information operations to influence the American public, but recognized the potential for "backwash" of IPI information to the United States and so called for coordinated domestic and foreign public affairs operations to synchronize foreign policy messages.

The newly-released Information Operations Roadmap, with the goal of expansion and central coordination of Pentagon PSYOP and public diplomacy operations, also recognizes the legal conundrum presented by the use of overseas propaganda in the information age. But while the document recognizes the need for boundaries-referred to as "[l]anes"-between U.S. public diplomacy and foreign propaganda, it fails to provide any such limits:

*"The likelihood that PSYOP messages will be replayed to a much broader audience, including the American public, requires that specific boundaries be established for PSYOP. In particular:*

*(U) PSYOP should focus on support to military endeavors (exercises, deployments and operations) in non-permissive or semi-permissive environments (i.e., when adversaries are part of the equation).*

*(U) DoD should collaborate with other agencies for U.S. Government public diplomacy programs and information objectives. PSYOP forces and capabilities can be employed in support of public diplomacy (e.g., as part of approved theater security cooperation guidelines.)*

*(U) DoD Public Affairs should be more proactive in support of U.S. Government Public Diplomacy objectives to include a broader set of select foreign media and audiences.*

The discussion of the relationship between public diplomacy and IO neither cites the applicable legal restrictions nor institutes specific guidelines, but references only the "intent" of the U.S. government in "targeting" either foreign or domestic audiences:

*(U) Impact of the global village. The increasing ability of people in most parts of the globe to access international information sources makes targeting particular audiences more difficult. Today the distinction between foreign and domestic audiences becomes more a question of USG intent rather than information dissemination practices:*

- (U) PSYOP is restricted by both DoD policy and executive order from targeting American audiences, our military personnel and news agencies or outlets.*
  - (U) However, information intended for foreign audiences, including public diplomacy and PSYOP, increasingly is consumed by our domestic audience and vice-versa.*
  - (U) PSYOP messages disseminated to any audience except individual decision-makers (and perhaps even then) will often be replayed by the news media for much larger audiences, including the American public.*

By means of recommendations for enhancing PSYOP capabilities, the oversight panel directed "improvements . . . to rapidly generate audience specific, commercial-quality products into denied areas" and a "focus on aggressive behavior modification at the operational and tactical

level of war." Additionally, the Roadmap cites improved military support to public diplomacy efforts and support for "active public affairs programs that influence foreign audiences" as vital components of the new IO strategy.

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## Documents

Note: The following documents are in PDF format.

You will need to download and install the free [Adobe Acrobat Reader](#) to view.

### **Document 1: Department of Defense, Information Operations Roadmap, October 30, 2003, Secret [Excised].**

Source: Freedom of Information Act request

### **Document 2: Joint Publication 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, September 5, 2003.**

Source: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_53.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_53.pdf)

### **Document 3: National Security Decision Directive NSDD-77, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," January 14, 1983.**

Source: Freedom of Information Act request.

### **Document 4: Reorganization Plan and Report, Submitted by President Clinton to the Congress on December 30, 1998, Pursuant to Section 1601 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, as Contained in Public Law 105-277.**

Source: <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68-dos.htm>

### **Document 5: Presidential Decision Directive PDD-68, "International Public Information (IPI), April 30, 1999 [Classified].**

Source: Summary from Steven Aftergood, Federation of American Scientists,

<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68.htm>, citing IPI Core Group Charter, obtained by the *Washington Times* (Ben Barber, "Group Will Battle Propaganda Abroad," *Washington Times*, 28 July 1999).

### **Document 6: National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-16, July 2002 [Classified].**

Source: Summarized in Power Point presentation on Information Warfare, Florida International University, 2004, <http://www.fiu.edu/~apodaca/Information%20Warfare%20Lecture.ppt>

## REFERENCES

James Bamford, "The Man Who Sold the War: Meet John Rendon, Bush's general in the propaganda war," *Rolling Stone*, November 17, 2005, available at [http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/store/\\_/id/8798997](http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/store/_/id/8798997).

Stephen J. Hedges, "Media use backfires on U.S.; Many ask if Pentagon altered information to make case for war," *Chicago Tribune*, December 11, 2005.

Col. Sam Gardiner (USAF, Ret.), "[Truth from These Podia: Summary of a Study of Strategic Influence, Perception Management, Strategic Information Warfare and Strategic Psychological Operations in Gulf II](#)," October 8, 2003, also available at [http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth\\_1.pdf](http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/whispers/documents/truth_1.pdf).

Ltc. Susan L. Gough, "[The Evolution of Strategic Influence, U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project](#)," April 7, 2003, also available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/gough.pdf>.

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